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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I argue that in cases in which competent adult patients have been suffering from long-term 
gender identity disorders which interfere with their everyday life functions, gender reassignment surgery 
is a morally permissible treatment option. Though many argue that it is morally impermissible to allow 
the use of surgery for such non-medical things as reassigning gender, I argue that the use of surgery for 
reassigning gender is morally permissible on the basis of Kantian autonomy and Utilitarian reasoning.  In 
this paper, I will further discuss my argument, as well as the primary objections to the argument and my 
replies to those objections. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Before I knew I was transsexual, I went through years of pain… It’s only now that I’m 
living as a woman that I finally feel comfortable with myself” (“Real Lives – Three 
Transsexuals”). This quote, from a male-to-female transsexual individual who was 
living as a woman while waiting to qualify for gender re-assignment surgery (GReS), 
demonstrates the agony that those who struggle with gender identity disorders (GIDs) 
undergo while ‘trapped’ in the physical and social conventions of their biological 
gender, as well as the relief that comes with living as a member of their “true” gender. 
Though some may argue that use of surgery for purposes of treating GIDs is morally 
unacceptable since transsexuality does not belong within the domain of medicine, 
GReS is morally permissible. In cases in which adult patients have been suffering from 
a severe gender-related mind-body imbalance which interferes with their everyday life 
functions, gender reassignment surgery is a morally permissible treatment option, 
provided that the patients requesting it are competent and are able to pay for the surgery 
out-of-pocket as an elective surgery without any serious financial detriment to their 
dependent family members. Since the inner struggle that goes with transsexuality is 
something that can be fixed by changing the body through surgery, surgery is a viable 
treatment option. If someone has the money to achieve a desired image that he or she 
feels ‘matches what’s on the inside,’ along with enough competence to fully understand 
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the risks and benefits of undergoing surgery, then he or she, as an autonomous agent, 
has the right to do so.  
 
 
Background 
 
Gender identity disorder has been classified as a psychiatric disorder in the DSM-IV, 
the handbook for psychiatric disorders, since 1980 (Draper and Evans, 97). According 
to the DSM-IV, gender identity disorder, or transsexuality, involves: a strong, long-
standing identification with another gender, a long-standing disquiet about the sex 
assigned biologically, and clinically significant discomfort or impairment at work, in 
social situations, or other important areas of life (American Psychological Association, 
302.85).  Furthermore, someone is not classified by the DSM-IV as having a 
transsexual disorder if there is a physical intersex condition (American Psychological 
Association, 302.85).  
 
In contrast to the American Psychological Association, many transgender reform 
advocates argue that transsexuality is not a mental disorder, but rather a physical 
problem which can be alleviated by means of a combination of physical therapies 
designed to change the body. Whether transsexuality is viewed as a mental disorder or 
whether it is viewed as simply another category of gender that should be accepted by 
society as legitimate, the moral tension on the issue of GReS remains strong since 
GReS is an invasive surgery or group of surgeries which requires lots of medical 
resources that may, at times, be scarce. The two conceptions of transsexuality, (a) that it 
is a primarily psychiatric disorder and (b) that it is a primarily physical disorder, vary 
widely in their arguments regarding GReS. These conceptions of transsexuality and 
their opinions regarding the moral permissibility of GReS will be discussed briefly 
below.  
 
For those who accept the idea that transsexuality is a psychiatric disorder, there is moral 
tension regarding whether it is the duty of surgery to solve problems that could possibly 
be dealt with by means of a psychosocial approach or whether surgery is ever a morally 
acceptable, medically appropriate solution to the mind-body incongruity that exists in 
transsexual individuals. One must consider how to go about defining who should 
provide treatment, as well as what kind of treatment is medically appropriate. Some 
definitions of health, such as Daniel Callahan’s, include physical well-being as a 
criterion for health while rejecting social and psychological well-being as legitimate 
criteria (Callahan, 77-87). However, other definitions, such as that of the World Health 
Organization, include psychological and social well-being in the criteria for health 
(Callahan, 78-79). The difference between these two conceptions of what it means to be 
healthy leads to moral tension on the issue of surgery’s role in treating GID, since GIDs 
are classified under the realm of psychiatry rather than the realm of surgery. People 
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who maintain that all psychiatric disorders should be treated solely by psychologists 
and psychiatrists hold that GReS is not an acceptable solution to transsexualism. To 
accept GReS as a solution to transsexuality would be to medicalize the issue of 
transsexualism, according to people like Daniel Callahan. Additionally, some may 
argue that surgeries which limit the function of healthy organs or produce significant 
health risk, as GReS does, should not be performed. If harm can be done to the patient 
with an elective surgery such as GReS, some may say, it should not be performed since 
surgery should only be done if it benefits a patient medically. The moral tension of this 
issue primarily lies in whether it is the duty of surgery to solve problems that could 
possibly be dealt with by means of a psychosocial approach, and whether surgery is 
ever a morally acceptable, medically appropriate solution to achieving a new identity as 
a transsexual. Those who accept GID as a true psychiatric disorder and use the WHO’s 
definition of health would argue that GReS may be morally permissible in some cases, 
whereas those who accept GID as a psychiatric disorder and use Callahan’s definition 
of health would argue that using GReS to treat GID would never be morally 
permissible.  
 
Those who believe that transsexualism is a physical problem, on the other hand, 
maintain that for some transsexuals, surgery is a medically appropriate treatment that 
has the potential to emotionally heal and provide a source of inner peace for those who 
feel their biological gender is incompatible with their inner gender identity (Girshick, 
143-146; Winters, GIDReform). Since the primary cause of discomfort is physical, 
physical solutions are the key, according to this group of people. Furthermore, this 
group argues, transsexuality should not be classified as a psychiatric disorder since it is 
a biological problem rather than a mental illness. The stigmatization of transsexuality 
resulting from its classification in the DSM-IV as a ‘gender identity disorder’ has been 
very harmful for transgendered people since it has led to an increase in violence, 
medical neglect, and discrimination towards transgendered individuals (Girshick, 145). 
As Girshick puts it, “…application of these diagnostic labels unnecessarily pathologizes 
transgender and gender-variant people” (Girshick, 145). To call transgenderism an 
identity disorder, Girshick argues, is to suggest that having a transsexual gender 
identity is not legitimate (Girshick, 145). Treating gender identity that varies from the 
norm as a disease is simply wrong, people like Girshick argue. If society – as well as 
the medical profession – were to accept transsexuals as another category of gender, this 
would most likely lead to the elimination of GID as a psychiatric disorder, impacting 
patients’ ability to obtain GReS. It is important to note, however, that though many 
advocates for gender-variant individuals are pushing for acceptance of genders outside 
of the gender binary, they also worry that the elimination of GID as a disorder might 
even more severely restrict access to GReS (GID Reform Advocates; Girshick, 145-
146; Green 91-93; Lev, 177-181). GReS is already quite difficult to obtain. With the 
elimination of GID as an “admission ticket” to therapy, it might become even more 
difficult to obtain surgery (Lev, 177). In most places, gender-variant people must be 
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diagnosed with GID and have lived in the opposite gender for approximately a year, in 
order to be eligible for the surgery and, in some cases, even for hormone therapy (Lev, 
207-210, 261-263). Additionally, it is already very difficult to obtain funding for GReS 
(Green, 91-92). Eliminating GID as a psychiatric classification may lead to increased 
restrictions on the surgery, as well as more difficulty in obtaining insurance 
reimbursement for medical treatments (Lev, 177-181).  
 
Considerations regarding the status of GID as a disorder and its relation to access to 
GReS are important since many people who identify as transsexual strongly desire 
body modification as the last step of their identity achievement (Lev, 258-269). Serious 
incongruity between body and soul can, understandably, be very disquieting for an 
individual. Some transsexuals can achieve an adequate sense of body-soul congruency 
through hormonal therapies and cross-dressing, but for some, body modification is 
perceived as an integral part of achieving an identity as a member of the opposite 
gender (Lev, 258). In order to achieve full body modification, surgery is often required 
for patient satisfaction (Lev, 207-210). Hormone therapies can only do so much for 
patients; they can give MtF transsexuals breasts, but they can never give them a vagina. 
Cross-dressing and hormone therapies can give an FtM transsexual some sense of being 
male, but when he looks in the mirror, it is still a woman’s soft face which looks back 
at him.  
 
 
Arguments for the Moral Permissibility of GReS 
 
Though some claim that surgery has no place as a morally acceptable possibility in the 
treatment of GIDs or in alleviating the disequilibrium that exists between body and soul 
in transsexual individuals, looking to bioethical principles leads to the conclusion that it 
is indeed morally permissible under certain conditions. The primary reason that GReS 
is morally permissible has its basis in the notion of patient autonomy, an idea that 
comes directly from Kantian reasoning. If someone is a rational person, he or she is 
free. Thus, he or she possesses autonomy and is entitled to make proactive decisions 
about his or her own healthcare. Competent adults who have identified themselves as 
transsexual have the right to self-determination. Those who have the right to self-
determination have the right to decide what to do with their bodies. Therefore, 
competent, adult individuals have the right to request and receive GReS.  
 
Competence is key when it comes who should be able to obtain access to GReS. The 
decision to undergo GReS is not one lightly undertaken or hastily made; rather, it is 
often the final step towards completion of a long, arduous journey of identity 
realization as a member of the opposite sex (Lev, 259). According to Arlene Istar Lev, 
a clinical social worker and family therapist, most gender-variant people go through 
stages in achieving their desired gender identity (Lev, 229-270). Some people stop at 
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cross-dressing and hormone therapy, while others continue on to request GReS. All 
human beings go through different stages in realizing their identities, but for people 
who are gender-variant this can be much more difficult since society is generally quite 
intolerant of gender categories outside of the gender binary.  
 
Lori Girshick, author of Transgender Voices has proposed that gender is not something 
that can be broken up into discrete categories, but rather that gender identity is a 
continuum and that people at all points on the gender continuum should be accepted by 
society (Girshick, 180-183). But unfortunately, society currently does not follow the 
gender continuum model. Most people in society are quite hesitant to reject the gender 
binary. Many, though not all, people who identify as transsexual or gender dysphoric 
have, at some point in their lives, experienced discrimination, harassment, violence, or 
medical neglect (Girshick, 139-143). Thus, those who request GReS understand the 
social risks they would be undertaking in undergoing GReS and becoming a member of 
the opposite gender. Though they may have, over the years, been criticized, ridiculed, 
or even harassed for their unconventional gender and lifestyles, the achievement of a 
fully realized identity is more important to them than social acceptance. If someone 
feels so strongly about something as to take risks like those, one must conclude that it is 
something of utmost important to them. Autonomy should, as always, be highly 
respected, but it should be especially respected for those making decisions which have 
such profound social risks. 
 
It is important, however, to note that there is an additional stipulation regarding the 
right to request and receive GReS: competent adults only have the right to request 
GReS so long as it does not infringe upon their dependents’1 qualities of life in any 
major financial way. The idea that one must take others’ needs into account comes 
directly from Kantian moral theory.  Since we possess autonomy, Kant argues, we also 
possess human dignity and are therefore obligated to accept responsibility for our 
actions (Rachels, 127-129). Thus, as John Hardwig argues, one must consider the needs 
of those close to him or her when making serious medical decisions (Hardwig, 5-10). 
This would especially apply to cases such as GReS, which, in addition to causing 
emotional distress to those close to the patient, is usually not covered by health 
insurance and must be paid for as an out-of-pocket expense. The possibility for impact 
on family members – especially financial impact – is great. Thus, Kantian philosophers 
would conclude that though patient autonomy must be respected, the needs and 
interests of others are also important.  
 
Feminist moral theory also would advocate considering relationships, though perhaps to 
a greater degree than Kantian moral theory since it is much more concerned with 
relationships. There is, however, a limit to the consideration that others may receive 
when one is making such a profound decision about his or her body. Since the gender-
                                               
1
 Please note that ‘dependents’ may include children, parents, or spouses. 
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questioning individual is the one most affected by his or her gender, his or her interests 
must be considered as being the most important.  
 
Utilitarian philosophers would argue that if one strongly identifies as transsexual and 
wishes to receive GReS against the wishes of parents, siblings, spouses, or children, he 
or she should be able to do so on the basis that the amount of happiness that stands to 
be gained by the person wishing to undergo GReS is, in most cases, much greater than 
the happiness that stands to be gained should family members continue to live with the 
anguish that comes with being close to someone attempting to suppress an identity that 
is trying to claw its way out.  
 
That being said, one must also look at the practical side of the issue. GReS costs quite a 
bit of money, and currently is not paid for by most health insurance (Girshick, 144-
146). Thus, under the current system in which insurance does not generally pay for 
GReS procedures, only the financial considerations of individuals dependent on the 
prospective candidate for surgery may be considered to be more important than the 
concerns of the candidate requesting surgery. Though feminist theory would say that all 
concerns of other family members must be considered, only the financial considerations 
of dependents may be considered to be as important as the transsexual patient’s desire 
to undergo surgery since the application of Utilitarian moral philosophy yields the 
conclusion that the amount of pleasure that stands to be gained from most prospective 
patients is far greater than the amount of pleasure that stands to be gained by family 
members in maintaining the status quo. Provided that financial means are adequate and 
that those dependent on the transsexual in question will not be negatively financially 
affected by their loved one undergoing GReS, then it is morally permissible for said 
transsexual to undergo GReS. Familial support is not necessary for GReS to be morally 
permissible, but it should be noted that many who do not have adequate positive 
familial support are seen as poor candidates for the surgery, possibly because support 
is, quite understandably, often needed for such a radical lifestyle transition (Lev, 43). 
Nevertheless, it is morally permissible for a transsexual individual to undergo GReS so 
long as the patient is competent and can pay for the surgery without any significant 
financial detriment to dependents. 
 
 
Arguments against the Moral Permissibility of GReS 
 
There are several possible objections to the argument that GReS is morally permissible. 
Three of them will be discussed here. The first possible objection is that it is morally 
wrong for a physician to remove healthy, functioning organs from a patient under any 
circumstances, on the basis that such actions are incongruous with the goals of 
medicine. Those who make this objection against GReS argue that removing healthy 
organs for non-prophylactic reasons is an action diametrically opposed to the primary 
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duty of physicians: “First, do no harm” (Oath of Hippocrates). It does not make any 
sense, medically speaking, to remove healthy organs. Therefore, proponents of this idea 
argue, undergoing GReS is unnatural, medically inappropriate, and morally 
impermissible. Destroying breasts, ovaries, and uteri that are full of diseased, cancerous 
cells is entirely different from removing the same organs from a healthy person. 
Resolving psychiatric issues such as GID should not involve surgery that removes 
perfectly healthy organs, some may argue.  
 
Another reason for objection to the argument that GReS is morally permissible can be 
found using Daniel Callahan’s definition of health, which defines health as having to do 
solely with physical states. Currently, transsexuality is classified as a psychiatric 
disorder by those in the psychiatric and medical community. Thus, some may object to 
the argument for GReS on the grounds that surgery should not be used for disorders 
that are primarily psychiatric or psychosocial, such as transsexuality. Daniel Callahan 
would certainly agree with this assessment; in his essay on the WHO definition of 
health, Callahan warns against the ‘medicalization of the human condition’ (Callahan, 
77-87). To consider surgery as a possible treatment option for GID would be to 
medicalize gender variance. Having a medical solution to a non-medical problem, it can 
be argued, is not only wasteful of precious medical resources, but also entirely illogical. 
 
The third argument against allowing GReS as a treatment option has to do with whether 
a doctor/psychiatrist/team of doctors should treat the physical symptoms of a 
psychiatric disorder on the basis of what would make a patient ‘feel’ better or whether 
the psychiatric causes of disorder should be treated. For example, one could argue that 
a doctor could not justifiably encourage, nor condone, that a patient suffering from 
severe anorexia nervosa – also classified as a psychiatric disorder by the DSM-IV-TR – 
continue to starve himself or herself on the basis that being thinner would make the 
patient feel more comfortable with him or herself in the context of the psychiatric 
disorder; to do so would be utterly negligent and medically inappropriate (Wilson, G., 
“Anorexia Nervosa”). In the same vein of argument, a doctor could not justifiably 
encourage, nor condone, that a patient suffering from transsexuality undergo dramatic, 
life-altering surgery in order to make the patient feel more comfortable in the context of 
his or her disorder. Thus, it can be argued that just as starving oneself is not the 
appropriate way in which an anorexic can come to terms with his or her body, surgery 
is not the antidote for transsexuality as both solutions only address the physical 
symptoms of the real problems. One can claim that in the two examples outlined above, 
superficial solutions only serve to mask the underlying disorder. 
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Replies to Arguments against the Moral Permissibility of GReS: 
 
The first objection to the argument that GReS should be considered morally permissible 
makes good points, but ultimately falls short since it fails to consider all possible 
situations in which one might want to have a healthy organ removed or incapacitated. 
For example, both Kantianism and Utilitarianism would consider it morally permissible 
for men and women who are certain that they do not want to bear any more children to 
undergo vasectomies and tubal ligations that will almost guarantee no more offspring 
will result from sexual intercourse. These procedures essentially incapacitate the sexual 
reproductive organs in males and females. One cannot make the claim that there is a 
qualitative moral difference between such procedures and the procedures that remove 
sex organs in transsexuals during GReS. In the case of transsexual patients, the sex 
organs can be removed and replaced by reconstructed sex organs of the desired gender. 
Changing gender may mean trading functioning organs for ‘organs’ that are largely 
nonfunctional, in addition to creating medical risks for patients. 
 
Medical risks for FtM transsexuals include: risk of infection, excessive scarring, or loss 
of function at the tissue donor site (Green, 109). The function and appearance of 
genitalia for FtM transsexuals may be less satisfactory than for MtF transsexuals 
(Brown). Though the surgery for MtF transsexuals is different in that it uses skin closer 
to the actual site of surgery, medical risks for MtF transsexuals are quite similar. The 
sex organs are as functional as the surgeon makes them; sometimes the MtF 
transwoman will have a clitoris which ‘functions’ in that she may be aroused sexually 
and the FtM transman will have a penis which allows him to become aroused sexually 
(Green, 109). But transwomen and transmen no longer have reproductive capabilities 
after surgery. There are risks involved, and the ‘sex organs’ of transwomen and 
transmen are nonfunctional in that they cannot produce offspring in the same way that 
the sex organs of a biologically female or male can. However, this does not mean that 
they have no importance for the patient. Having the ‘proper’ genitalia may serve as the 
final step for many transsexuals in their journey toward a new gender identity. As 
Jamison Green, a well-known transsexual activist and writer, puts it: “There are a lot of 
reasons to have lower surgery, not the least of which is the desire to have one’s body 
match one’s gender identity–to feel whole, as some describe it” (Green, 107). Thus, the 
replacement of biological sex organs with non-functional sex organs can have a 
significant impact on the psychological well-being of the patient and should, therefore, 
be considered as having positive moral weight when one is evaluating the moral 
permissibility of removing healthy organs such as the mammary glands.  
 
Though it is true that the goals of medicine are diametrically opposed to the intentional, 
non-prophylactic removal of healthy organs, it is also true that in some cases, organs 
are not needed for certain goals of patients. Here, the role of patient autonomy is 
important. If a competent patient has determined that an organ is unnecessary to his or 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                             Hume | 45 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
her goals for personal well-being and that, furthermore, said organ is causing him or her 
some type of discomfort, it can be considered morally permissible for a doctor to 
remove said organ so long as removing said organ will not profoundly negatively affect 
other people. Possible negative effects on other people that must be considered include 
possible detrimental financial effects on dependents such as children or parents. 
Though the views regarding GReS of others to whom a transsexual is close are 
important, they do not outweigh the preferences of the patient requesting GReS. Both 
of aforementioned criteria – that the patient is competent and that undergoing surgery 
will not detrimentally financially affect the patient’s dependents – must be met in order 
for removal of a healthy organ to be considered morally permissible.  
 
The second argument against the moral permissibility of GReS – that transsexualism is 
a psychiatric disorder and that psychiatric disorders do not merit surgical treatments – is 
faulty since transsexuality cannot be ‘cured’ using psychiatric therapies. All that 
psychiatric treatments could achieve would be to change a person’s perception of 
himself or herself so that it matches what the gender binary society expects. Psychiatric 
therapies could not change a person’s physical gender, but only distort his or her 
perception of his or her gender. Additionally, therapies which attempt to change a 
person’s gender are, thus far, largely ineffective. According to The Merck Manual for 
Healthcare Professionals, “Treatment [of transsexuals] is aimed at helping patients 
adapt rather than trying to dissuade them from their identity; in any case, the latter 
approach is ineffective” (Brown). Often, in order to alleviate the distress that comes 
with body-soul incongruity, outward appearances must be changed. Surgery, when 
combined with hormone therapy, is the only way to actually change a patient’s outward 
appearance to make it look like that of the opposite gender. Only surgery has the power 
to change someone’s physical sex. Thus, it cannot be argued that surgery has no place 
in the treatment of GIDs.  
 
The third argument against the moral permissibility of GReS – that surgical treatment 
would only serve to superficially treat the physical aspects of disorders that are 
primarily psychiatric – is also faulty. Whereas anorexia truly is a mental disorder, 
transsexuality is not. Though it is classified by the American Psychological Association 
as a psychiatric disorder, many are pushing for change (GIDReform.org).  According to 
many experts on the subject, transsexuality actually is a physical problem rather than a 
psychiatric disorder. As such, it deserves a physical treatment. Since transsexuality is a 
physical problem that deserves physical treatment, surgical treatments are morally 
permissible. Psychiatry cannot change physical appearances, and it cannot cure 
physical problems. As such, transsexuality does not belong within the realm of 
psychiatry. Rather, surgery is a morally permissible treatment for alleviating the 
distress of being trapped in the ‘wrong’ body.  
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Conclusion 
 
As much as some may try to separate mental well-being from overall health, the fact 
remains that there is an inseparable connection between mind and body. No one field 
can conquer the mysteries of body and mind. Medicine and psychiatry must work in 
tandem to produce results that are beneficial to patients. The body is servant to the 
power of the mind. Though appearances are not everything, what one feels is right on 
the inside should be reflected on the outside. On the basis of individual patient 
autonomy, it is morally permissible for adult patients who have been suffering from 
long-term gender identity disequilibrium which interfere with their everyday life 
functions to receive gender re-assignment surgery, as long as a few conditions are met. 
The conditions are: (a) the surgery will not cause undue financial stress to family 
members, such that dependents would be put in a bad situation, (b) the person receiving 
the surgery is able to pay for it, and (c) the choice is made entirely autonomously by the 
patient. The primary reason that gender re-assignment surgery should be available as a 
morally permissible option is due to the Kantian notion of autonomy and the Utilitarian 
principle of the greatest pleasure for the greatest number; each competent person is an 
autonomous agent and can decide for himself or herself what is both in his or her best 
interest and in the best interest of those around him or her. This argument stands up to 
opposing arguments that removing healthy organs is always morally wrong, that 
transsexuality should not be treated with surgery, and that surgery is a superficial 
treatment to a deeper problem, primarily due to the fact that transsexuality is a physical 
problem rather than a psychiatric problem. It has been established that GReS is morally 
permissible. The next question is, as always, where we can go from here in providing 
adequate options for persons seeking help in realizing their gender identities.  For 
society to move forward, the definition of gender must change from the binary to a 
continuum. Human beings cannot be categorized discretely. The full realization of an 
individual’s identity can only be achieved peacefully if society is to become more 
accepting and tolerant of diversity in gender, race, religion, and all other discrete 
categories which divide people. We must come together, united in the midst of 
difference, in order to move forward toward a better, more peaceful world filled with 
justice, diversity, and acceptance. 
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